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NOTE
RECOGNIZING THE UNIQUE STATUS OF ADDITIONAL
NAMED INSUREDS
INTRODUCTION
The two major parties to a liability insurance policy' are the insurer 2
and the insured.3 The term "insured" encompasses different categories.'
For example, the distinction between a named insured-a party specifi-
1. Insurance has been defined as a device for the transfer of risks of individual enti-
ties to an insurer who agrees for a consideration to assume, to a specified extent, losses
suffered by the insured. R. Osler & J. Bickley, Glossary of Insurance Terms 77 (1972);
see I G. Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d § 1:2, at 6-7 (rev. ed. 1984).
In liability insurance policies, the insurer agrees to cover its insured's legal liability for
damages. Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 677 F.2d 455, 459 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc), vacated on other grounds, 706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1983); see Slavens v. Standard
Accident Ins. Co., 27 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1928); 6B J. Appleman, Insurance Law &
Practice § 4254, at 26 (Buckley ed. 1979); 1 G. Couch, supra, § 1:72, at 215; I. Taylor,
Law of Insurance 61 (3d ed. 1983). A standard liability policy might read: "The com-
pany will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages . . . ." 1 G. Couch, supra, § 1:72, at 215 (emphasis in
original); see, e.g., Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 152 Cal. App. 2d 292,
295, 313 P.2d 602, 605 (1957); Valdes v. Smalley, 303 So. 2d 342, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974); Daly v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 655, 658, 273 N.E.2d 505, 507
(1971); DeWitt v. Young, 229 Kan. 474, 476, 625 P.2d 478, 480 (1981); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co., 172 Ohio St. 507, 508, 178 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1961);
Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 229 (W. Va. 1981); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv.
Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 95, 267 N.W.2d 595, 597 (1978). When the insured
becomes liable, the damages must be paid by the insurer. Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza
Corp., 677 F.2d at 459; 12 G. Couch, supra, § 45:16, at 247; see 6B J. Appleman, supra,
§ 4261, at 72. Under indemnity policies, on the other hand, the insured must have suf-
fered an actual money loss before the insurer is obligated to pay. Continental Oil Corp. v.
Bonanza Corp., 677 F.2d at 459; American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 215 So. 2d 245, 249 (Miss. 1968); 6B J. Appleman, supra, § 4261, at 72; 12 G.
Couch, supra, § 45:16, at 246-47. The distinction is often of no significance, see 12 G.
Couch, supra, § 45:17, at 248, and does not affect the analysis of this Note.
2. Davis, Rights and Liabilities of Principals in the Insurance Relationship-4 Par-
tial Survey, 5 Ark. L. Rev. 24, 25 (1951). The insurer is the party assuming the risk,
underwriting the risk or the policy, or the actual entity with whom the insurance contract
has been made. National Sec., Inc. v. Johnson, 14 Ariz. App. 31, 33, 480 P.2d 368, 370
(1971); 12 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7001, at 13; see I R. Long, Law of Liability
Insurance § 1.02[1] (1984).
3. Davis, supra note 2, at 25. The insured is the entity that will receive a certain sum
on the happening of an event specified in the insurance policy. Pleasant v. Motors Ins.
Co., 280 N.C. 100, 104, 185 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1971); see Kent v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co.,
177 Neb. 709, 724, 131 N.W.2d 146, 154 (1964). There is no distinction between the
words "assured" and "insured." 1 R. Long, supra note 2, § 1.02[3].
4. Levanthal v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 159 Ga. App. 104, 105, 283 S.F.2d 3, 5
(1981); see Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d 751, 758-59 (7th Cir. 1981);
Tenopir v. State Farm Mut. Co., 403 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1968); Jarvis v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 633 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1981) (applying California law); Swift
& Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. 1974); Pelych v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
91 Misc. 2d 973, 977, 401 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31
Wash. 2d 533, 539, 197 P.2d 999, 1005 (1948); I. Taylor, supra note 1, at 74.
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cally designated as the insured in the original policy'-and an additional
insured-a party protected under the policy without being named
therein 6-is well established.7 The two entities are treated differently in
many aspects of insurance law.8
5. R. Osler & J. Bickley, supra note 1, at 102; see Levanthal v. American Bankers
Ins. Co., 159 Ga. App. 104, 106, 283 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1981); Pelych v. Potomac Ins. Co., 91
Misc. 2d 973, 978, 401 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash.
2d 533, 539, 197 P.2d 999, 1005 (1948). The named insured is always an insured, unless
there is a clearly stated condition placing him in another category. Rig Tenders, Inc. v.
Santa Fe Drilling Co., 585 P.2d 505, 508 (Alaska 1978); see Tenopir v. State Farm Mut.
Co., 403 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1968); Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash. 2d 533, 539, 197
P.2d 999, 1005 (1948).
6. R. Osler & J. Bickley, supra note 1, at 3; 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 704, at 759
(1982). A common example of an additional insured is a person covered under a liability
policy by a definition of insured that extends protection to interests, not specifically desig-
nated, according to a status, such as that of employee, R. Osler & J. Bickley, supra note 1,
at 102; 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 721, at 789-90 (1982); see Randolph v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 255 Iowa 943, 946, 124 N.W.2d 528, 529 (1963); Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 211 Va. 373, 375, 177 S.E.2d 625, 627 (1970), or
household member, 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance § 704, at 759-60 (1982); see Cal-Farm Ins.
Co. v. Boisseranc, 151 Cal. App. 2d 775, 777, 312 P.2d 401, 402 (1957); DeWitt v.
Young, 229 Kan. 474, 476-77, 625 P.2d 478, 481 (1981); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Walker, 334 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). Another common example is an
additional insured pursuant to an omnibus clause that, by its definition of insured, ex-
tends coverage to permissive users of the named insured's automobile without naming
them in the policy. R. Osler & J. Bickley, supra note 1, at 112 (1972); 12 G. Couch, supra
note 1, § 45:293, at 618-19; see Whelchel v. Sommer, 413 F.2d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 1969);
Arnold v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 161, 162-63 (7th Cir. 1958); DeWitt
v. Young, 229 Kan. 474, 476-77, 625 P.2d 478, 481 (1981); Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste.
M. R.R. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury-Indem. Co., 268 Minn. 390, 396 n.3, 129 N.W.2d 777,
782 n.3 (1964); Swift & Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Mo. 1974); Bitumi-
nous Casualty Corp. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 599 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gould, 266 S.C. 521, 528, 224 S.E.2d 715, 718 (1976);
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Bobo, 595 S.W.2d 847,848 (Tex. 1980).
7. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Jarvis v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 633 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1981); see Peerless Ins. Co. v. Dimas,
539 F. Supp. 46, 47-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weber, 310 Minn.
52, 58, 245 N.W.2d 238, 242 (1976); Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R. Co. v. St. Paul
Mercury-Indem. Co., 268 Minn. 390, 397, 129 N.W.2d 777, 782 (1964); Swift & Co. v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. 1974); Employers Surplus Lines v. Stone, 388
P.2d 295, 297 (Okla. 1963); 1 R. Long, supra note 2, § 3.01, at 3-3.
8. For example, the burden of satisfying the duty to notify the insurer of a claim or
accident is less onerous on an additional insured than a named insured. See infra note
121 and accompanying text. An additional insured is not generally liable for the payment
of premiums. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. Many courts hold that for
the purpose of granting permission under an omnibus clause, an additional insured is
treated differently than a named insured. 1 R. Long, supra note 2, at § 3.02, at 3-4 to 3-
4.1; see, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. DeMaison, 213 F.2d 826, 834 (3d Cir. 1954);
Berthrong v. Certified Indem. Co., 31 Colo. App. 81, 83, 497 P.2d 1273, 1274 (1972);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 486 S.W.2d 38, 45-46 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1972); Truelove v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 5 N.C. App. 272, 275, 168 S.E.2d 59,
61 (1969); Belas v. Melanovich, 247 Pa. Super. 313, 325-26, 372 A.2d 478, 485 (1977);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Employers Mut. Ins. Co., 474 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971). But see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 54 111. 2d 333, 341-43,
297 N.E.2d 163, 167-68 (1973) (initial permission of named insured sufficient for subse-
quent users); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 155, 167,
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The courts sometimes recognize the existence of a third type of insured
known as an additional named insured.' This is an entity specifically
designated as an insured subsequent to the issuance of the original pol-
icy."0 A party typically becomes an additional named insured pursuant
to an agreement obligating the named insured to add the additional
named insured to the named insured's pre-existing policy." For exam-
299 A.2d 704, 710 (1973) (implied permission found); Thompson v. Ryan, 547 P.2d 1340,
1341 (Utah 1976) (unpermitted use covered because it furthered general purpose of
named insured). This is true even when the additional insured is specifically designated
on the policy. See, e.g., Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 163 Okla. 243, 245, 22 P.2d
997, 998 (1932); Swift & Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 826, 830-31 (Mo. 1974);
Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash. 2d 533, 549, 197 P.2d 999, 1004-05 (1948). But see Unigard
Ins. Co. v. Studer, 536 F.2d 1337, 1339 (10th Cir. 1976) (court unwilling to relegate
additional named insured to same status he had prior to being named in the policy).
Finally, under certain circumstances, an additional insured's protection may be greater
than the named insured's. Pelych v. Potomac Ins. Co., 91 Misc. 2d 973, 977, 401
N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1977). This occurs when an exclusion applicable to the
named insured does not bar the additional insured from recovering under the policy. See,
e.g., Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 862, 866 (2d Cir.
1969) (employee exclusion clause not applicable when named insured's employee sues
additional insured); Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 318 F.2d
714, 716 (4th Cir. 1963) (same); Howell v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 124 NJ. Super. 414,
419, 307 A.2d 142, 145 (1973) (fraudulent act of one insured does not bar recovery by
innocent co-insured), modified, 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974); Morgan v.
Greater N.Y. Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Assoc., 305 N.Y. 243, 249, 112 N.E.2d 273. 275-76
(1953) (intentional act committed by named insured does not relieve insurer of its obliga-
tion to additional insured). But see Steams-Roger Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 117 Ariz. 162, 165, 571 P.2d 659, 662 (1977) (en banc) (exclusion applicable to
employees of named insured applied to bar claim of additional insured); Kosior v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601, 604, 13 N.E.2d 423, 425 (1938) (additional insured barred
from recovery for intentional act of named insured).
9. See, e.g., Home Indem. Co. v. Wilson, 107 Ariz. 434, 437, 489 P.2d 244, 247
(1971); Caduceus Self Ins. Fund, Inc. v. South Florida Emergency Physicians, 436 So. 2d
1034, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ordonez v. W.T. Grant Co., 297 So. 2d 780, 781
(La. Ct. App. 1974); Anaconda Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.,
616 P.2d 363, 367 (Mont. 1980) (Sheehy, J., dissenting); Pelych v. Potomac Ins. Co., 91
Misc. 2d 973, 978, 401 N.Y.S.2d 374, 378 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Waller v. Rocky Mtn. Fire &
Casualty Co., 272 Or. 69, 86-87, 535 P.2d 530, 538 (1975) (en banc) (Tongue, J.,
dissenting).
10. See Caduceus Self Ins. Fund, Inc. v. South Florida Emergency Physicians, 436
So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Pelych v. Potomac Ins. Co., 91 Misc. 2d
973, 978, 401 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377-78 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Waller v. Rocky Mtn. Fire & Casu-
alty Co., 272 Or. 69, 86-87, 535 P.2d 530, 538 (1975) (en banc) (Tongue, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., Landry v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 731 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1984);
Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1977); Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., 488 F. Supp. 732, 740 & n.5, 743 (D. Nev. 1980), rer"d on
other grounds, 684 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co.,
470 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. Va. 1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel,
441 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 565 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978);
Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 626 & n.l, 532 P.2d 97, 98 &
n.1, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 450 & n.1 (1975); Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
152 Cal. App. 2d 292, 295, 313 P.2d 602, 604-05 (1957); Daly v. W.E. O'Neil Constr.
Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 655, 658, 273 N.E.2d 505, 507 (1971); Anaconda Co. v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 616 P.2d 363, 364 (Mont. 1980); Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Soe'y v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 196 Neb. 158, 161-62, 241 N.W.2d 674,
676-77 (1976); Sentry Ins. Co. v. George A. Rutherford, Inc., 92 N.M. 210, 210, 585 P.2d
1984]
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ple, a property owner seeking to make improvements may hire a contrac-
tor. As part of the arrangement, the owner may bargain for the
contractor's obligation to procure liability coverage in favor of the
owner. This is referred to here as an "agreement to procure." The con-
tractor's insurer, usually for little or no extra premium, 2 will issue the
contractor an endorsement that adds the owner as an additional named
insured to the policy in which the contractor is the named insured. The
previously executed policy and the endorsement insuring against new
risks form the new insurance policy.
13
Courts need an understanding of the contractual structure of the rela-
tionship of the parties in order to determine properly the extent of cover-
age afforded to an additional named insured and the other rights and
duties of such a party. Because the courts have failed to appreciate the
unique circumstances involved in an additional named insured contro-
versy, they have blindly treated additional named insureds as either
named 4 or additional insureds. 5 They have consequently reached re-
sults contrary to the intent of the parties. For example, the court in Oak-
1091, 1091 (1978). The practice of agreeing to procure insurance protection as part of a
contract is common. For example, in maritime contracts the standard charter agreement
usually requires that the charteree name the charterer as an additional named insured.
See Wedlock v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 554 F.2d 240, 242 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977). It is
standard practice for sublease provisions to require the sublessee to name the sublessor
and the owner on insurance policies. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Shopwell, Inc., 116 Misc. 2d
24, 26, 455 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (Spec. Term 1982).
12. See., e.g., Unigard Ins. Co. v. Studer, 536 F.2d 1337, 1338 (10th Cir. 1976) ($45
yearly additional premium); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (no additional premium); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel, 441 F.
Supp. 1, 11 (E.D. La. 1975) (no additional premium), affldper curiam, 565 F.2d 958 (5th
Cir. 1978); Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 152 Cal. App. 2d 292, 296, 313
P.2d 602, 605 (1957) (no additional premium); Ordonez v. W.T. Grant Co., 297 So. 2d
780, 782 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (10% additional premium); District-Realty Title Ins. Co. v.
Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc., 280 Md. 422, 426, 373 A.2d 952, 955 (1977) ("greatly
reduced premium"); Helmkamp v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 407 S.W.2d 559, 567
(Mo. Ct. App. 1966) ($30 additional premium).
13. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Leventhal, 276 A.2d 242, 243 (D.C. 1971) (per curiam);
Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 68, 72, 116 N.W.2d 434,
436 (1962); Smith v. Western Preferred Casualty Co., 424 So, 2d 375, 376 (La. Ct. App.
1983); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Gosnell, 246 Md. 724, 731, 230 A.2d 467, 471 (1967); Wyatt v.
Wyatt, 239 Minn. 434, 436, 58 N.W.2d 873, 875 (1953); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunlap,
525 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Kyle v. McCarron, 201 Pa. Super. 403, 407,
192 A.2d 253, 255 (1963); El-Habr v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 626 S.W.2d
171, 172 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); Riteway Builders, Inc. v. First Nat. Ins. Co. of Am., 22
Wis. 2d 418, 424, 126 N.W.2d 24, 26 (1964); 1 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 4:36, at 399-
402. If terms of the endorsement and the main policy conflict, the endorsement's terms
prevail. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 521, 524
(3d Cir. 1981); Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 254 Iowa 68, 72,
116 N.W.2d 434, 436 (1962); Smith v. Western Preferred Casualty Co., 424 So. 2d 375,
376 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Wyatt v. Wyatt, 239 Minn. 434, 437, 58 N.W.2d 873, 875
(1953); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 525 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
14. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
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land Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyd's 6 failed to recognize the unique
status of the additional named insured and treated him as a named in-
sured. The court applied a provision in the main policy that eliminated
coverage for stadiums 7 although the endorsement expressly added Oak-
land Stadium as an additional insured.' 8 In reaching this result, the
court made the dubious statement that an insurer need not be conferring
any benefit whatsoever when adding a party to a pre-existing policy., 9
This Note proposes that additional named insureds be treated as a dis-
tinct class of insureds apart from the traditional named insured/addi-
tional insured dichotomy. Such treatment would enable the courts to
apply a more sophisticated analysis beyond that employed in resolving
the usual insured-versus-insurer controversy. By recognizing an addi-
tional named insured as a unique type of third party beneficiary2" and
examining the structure of the relationships among insurer, named in-
sured and additional named insured, the courts would be more likely to
reach results consistent with the intentions of these parties.
Part I of this Note proposes standards of construction applicable to
liability insurance policies containing additional named insureds. Part II
discusses how these standards can be applied to determine the extent of
coverage afforded an additional named insured and the other rights2 l and
duties22 of that party.
I. ESTABLISHING GUIDELINES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
LIABILITY POLICIES INVOLVING AN ADDITIONAL NAMED
INSURED
The purpose and guiding principle of insurance contract 23 construc-
tion24 is to give effect to the intent of the parties.25 In accordance with
16. 152 Cal. App. 2d 292, 313 P.2d 602 (1957).
17. aId at 296-97, 313 P.2d at 604-05.
18. aI. Oakland Stadium was added to the policy as a condition to its allowing the
race sponsored by the named insured to take place. Id.
19. Ie at 299, 313 P.2d at 607. The court may have based its decision on the fact that
no additional premium was charged and that the endorsement stated "all other terms and
conditions" of the policy remain in effect. Id at 296-97, 313 P.2d 604-05.
20. See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 97-106 (right to be defended by the insurer) & notes 107-15 (right
to receive advance notice of policy cancellation) and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 116-23 (duty to notify the insurer of a claim or accident) & notes
124-32 (duty to pay the premium on the default of the named insured) and accompanying
text.
23. "[Ain insurance contract ... defines the risks which the underwriting insurance
company agrees to assume and the persons or entities entitled to protection against such
defined risks." National Hills Shopping Center, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 551 F.2d
655, 658 (5th Cir. 1977).
24. "By 'interpretation of language' we determine what ideas that language induces in
other persons. By 'construction of the contract,' . . . we determine its legal operation
.... " 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §534, at 9 (1951). Insurance cases invariably
require the construction of at least one provision of the policy in question, 2 G. Couch,
supra note 1, § 15:1, at 114, yet the courts do not look foward to this task, cf Continental
1984]
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the general principles of contract law,26 if the language of the policy is
clear and unambiguous, the court is bound by its terms.27 When the
contract language is ambiguous,28 however, the approach of the courts is
not uniform. Some will attempt to determine the intent of the parties by
examining extrinsic evidence,29 but others simply construe the policy
Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 677 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane) ("many would
sooner walk the plank than engage in the risky business of interpreting maritime insur-
ance policies"), vacated, 706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1983); Employers' Liab. Assurance
Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1969) (controversies could end if
insurers would simply say "clearly what they mean"); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Elec-
tronic Purification Co., 67 Cal. 2d 679, 691-92, 433 P.2d 174, 182, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390
(1967) (decrying trend which burdens the judiciary with resolving "linguistic Tower of
Babel" created by insurers).
25. Cain v. American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 645, 651, 183 A. 403, 406
(1936); Aragona v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 281 Md. 371, 375, 378 A.2d 1346,
1348 (1977); 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7385, at 110-13; 2 G. Couch, supra note 1,
§ 15:9, at 136; see Littrall v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 300 F.2d 340, 343 (7th Cir.
1962); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski, 33 N.Y.2d 169, 171, 305 N.E.2d
907, 909, 350 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Casualty
Co., 172 Ohio St. 507, 511, 178 N.E.2d 792, 796 (1961); McGann v. Hobbs Lumber Co.,
150 W. Va. 364, 367, 145 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1965).
26. In general, the principles of standard contract law are applicable to the construc-
tion of insurance policies. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 465 F.2d
934, 936 (9th Cir. 1972); First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648, 655 (Hawaii 1983); March
v. Snake River Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 89 Idaho 275, 280, 404 P.2d 614, 617 (1965); St. Paul
School Dist. v. Columbia Transit Corp., 321 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. 1982); 13 J. Ap-
pleman, supra note 1, § 7381, at 1; 2 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 15:1, at 115-16; see Latino
v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 413 F.2d 1043, 1043 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Asher
v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Cal. 1970). But see Theros v, Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d 205, 209, 407 P.2d 685, 688 (1965) (insurance contracts
differ from other contracts); Stordahl v. GEICO, 564 P.2d 63, 65-66 (Alaska 1977) (dif-
ferent standards of construction apply to insurance contracts).
27. Young v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 705, 707 (10th Cir. 1979); Biebel
Bros. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 522 F.2d 1207, 1210 (8th Cir. 1975); Float-
Away Door Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 372 F.2d 701, 706 (5th Cir. 1966), cerl.
denied, 389 U.S. 823 (1967); Butler v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 949, 952 (Ala.
1981); Hawkins Iron & Metal Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 462, 463, 196
S.E.2d 903, 904 (1973); Smith v. Western Preferred Casualty Co., 424 So. 2d 375, 376
(La. Ct. App. 1983); GEICO v. Kligler, 42 N.Y.2d 863, 864, 366 N.E.2d 865, 866, 397
N.Y.S.2d 777, 778 (1977) (mem.); American Casualty Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 568
P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1977); 2 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 15:4, at 122-23; see St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 1981). A
court should not strain to create an ambiguity in order to find coverage. St.Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 655 F.2d at 524; Tenopir v. State Farm
Mut. Co., 403 F.2d 533, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1968); Spiers v. Lane, 278 So. 2d 549, 554 (La.
Ct. App. 1973); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 525 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975); 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7402, at 289-91.
28. Language is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one con-
struction. Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Bennett
v. American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 495 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); see
American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257, 261 (D. Conn. 1965).
29. Zelinsky v. Associated Aviation Underwriters, 478 F.2d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1973);
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Auto-Owners (Mut.)
Ins. Co. v. Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 790, 793 (C.D. Ill. 1979);
Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass'n, 101 Idaho 772, 776, 620 P.2d 1102, 1106
(1980); Brady v. Highway Comm'r, 24 Il. App. 3d 972, 975-76, 322 N.E.2d 236, 238
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against the insurer without regard to the intent of the parties.30 In either
(1975); City of Spencer v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 216 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Iowa 1974); see
American Casualty Co. v. Reidy, 386 F.2d 795, 797 (7th Cir. 1967); Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. Va. 1979); Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 1292, 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Danielson v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 309 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Ga. 1969); McGann v. Hobbs Lumber Co.,
150 W. Va. 364, 370, 145 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1965); 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7383,
at 46-47. Some courts will look to agreements between the named insured and other
parties. See, eg., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 296 (9th Cir. 1977); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. Va. 1979); Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 1292, 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1976); St. Paul
School Dist. v. Columbia Transit Corp., 321 N.W.2d 41, 49 (Minn. 1982) (Yetka, J.,
dissenting). But see Carolina Casualty Ins. Co. v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 304,
313 (5th Cir. 1978) ("insurer's contractual obligations cannot ordinarily be altered by
collateral agreements"); Daly v. W. E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 133 IUl. App. 2d 655, 659, 273
N.E.2d 505, 508 (1971) (insurer's obligation determined by policy alone unless he is
aware of insured's collateral agreement). Other courts will look to the amount of pre-
mium charged by the insurer. See, eg., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1001 n.10 (2d Cir. 1974); Close-Smith v. Conley, 230 F. Supp.
411, 419 (D. Or. 1964); Prather v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 2 NJ. 496, 503, 67 A.2d
135, 138 (1949); see Lebow Assocs. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 152 Cal. App. 2d 292, 296,
313 P.2d 602, 605 (1957); District-Realty Title Ins. Corp. v. Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc.,
280 Md. 422, 426, 373 A.2d 952, 955 (1977); Beem v. General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp., 231 Mo. App. 685, 686, 105 S.W.2d 956, 957 (1937); Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kent, 85 Wash. 2d 942, 946, 540 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1975); 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1,
§ 7389, at 192. The custom of the insurance industry has also been considered. Harbor
Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see 2 G. Couch, supra note 1,
§ 15:60, at 307-08. Finally, some courts have examined the purpose behind procuring the
insurance. See, e.g., J.B. Kramer Grocery Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 709, 710-
11 (8th Cir. 1974); Brady v. Highway Comm'r, 24 Ill. App. 3d 972, 975-76, 322 N.E.2d
236, 238 (1975); McGann v. Hobbs Lumber Co., 150 W. Va. 364, 370-71, 145 S.E.2d 476,
481 (1965). The parol evidence rule, which "requires. . . the exclusion of extrinsic evi-
dence, oral or written, where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated
writing," 4 S. Williston, Williston on Contracts § 631, at 948-49 (3d ed. 1961), does not
bar the admission of outside evidence when the policy is ambiguous. Eggleston v. Dudley,
257 F.2d 398, 400 (3d Cir. 1958); Auto Owners (Mut.) Ins. Co. v. Midwest Emery
Freight System., 470 F. Supp. 790, 793 (C.D. Ill. 1979); Close-Smith v. Conley, 230 F.
Supp. 411,418 (D. Or. 1964); Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass'n, 101 Idaho 772,
777, 620 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1980); Celley v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 229
Pa. Super. 475, 483, 324 A.2d 430, 435 (1974); see Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Farm
Air Serv. Inc., 255 F.2d 658, 662-63 (5th Cir. 1958); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F.
Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Randolph v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 255 Iowa 943,
951, 124 N.W.2d 528, 532 (1963); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 3-3, at 110 (2d ed.
1977); 3 A. Corbin, supra note 24, § 579, at 420-21; cf. Baird & Warner, Inc. v. Ruud, 45
Ill. App. 3d 223, 229, 359 N.E.2d 745, 750 (1977) (extrinsic evidence may not be admit-
ted to change or vary unambiguous real estate brokerage contract).
30. Eg., Marston v. American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035, 1039 (1st Cir.
1971); Float-Away Door Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 372 F.2d 701, 705 (5th Cir.
1966), cert denied, 389 U.S. 823 (1967); McMichael v. American Ins. Co., 351 F.2d 665,
669 (8th Cir. 1965); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257, 260-61 (D. Conn.
1965); Roby v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 166 Conn. 395, 402, 349 A.2d 838, 842
(1974); Strain Poultry Farms, Inc. v. American S. Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 600, 602-03,
197 S.E.2d 498, 500 (1973); Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass'n, 101 Idaho 772,
776-77, 620 P.2d 1102, 1106-07 (1980); City of Spencer v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 216
N.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Iowa 1974); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 233 So. 2d
805, 810 (Miss. 1970); Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209, 214
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case, proper resolution of the unique issues presented in cases involving
additional named insureds requires an understanding of the contractual
structure of the relationship.
A. The Unique Contractual Structure of Policies Involving Additional
Named Insureds
The additional named insured is not a party to the insurance con-
tract.31 Yet, because the additional named insured is an insured under
the policy, his right to enforce an insurance contract in his favor has
never been disputed.3" The additional named insured must therefore be a
type of third party beneficiary 33-more particularly, a creditor
beneficiary. 34
A third party is a creditor beneficiary when the purpose of the prom-
isee in conferring a benefit is to discharge an obligation which the prom-
isee owes to the third party.35 If, by contrast, the purpose in obtaining
(Minn. 1984); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 229 (W. Va. 1981); 7 S. Williston,
supra note 29, at 16-17; see 12 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7401, at 197; 2 G. Couch,
supra note 1, § 15:48, at 283; Davis, supra note 2, at 31; cf Whiteman v. Federal Life Ins.
Co., 1 F.R.D. 95, 97 (W.D. Mo. 1939) (evidence of premium charged does not affect
imposing strict construction against insurers); Home v. Casualty Ins. Co., 62 Ga. App.
21, 22, 7 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1940) (same). See generally Keeton, Insurance Law Rights At
Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 961-63 (1970) (discussing ration-
ale behind strict construction). It is an almost universal holding that insurance policies
are to be construed against the insurer. 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7401, at 197; 2 G.
Couch, supra note 1, § 15:74, at 334; 7 S. Williston, supra note 26, § 900, at 16-17.
31. The additional named insured is neither a promisee nor a promisor because his
intent is not addressed to the insurer, and the insurer's intent is not addressed to him. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2, at 8-9 (1981). "The promisor and promisee are
the 'parties' to a promise; a third person who will benefit from the performance is a
'beneficiary.'" Id. comment g, at 12.
Further, there is no meeting of the minds between the additional named insured and
the insurer. See Vyn v. Northwest Casualty Co., 47 Cal. 2d 89, 93, 301 P.2d 869, 872
(1956); Cook v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 154 Ind. App. 346, 351, 289 N.E.2d 754, 758
(1972).
32. It is clear that by specifically designating the additional named insured as an in-
sured under the policy, the named insured and the insurer intend to benefit the additional
named insured, and that party therefore has the right to enforce that portion of the con-
tract in his favor. See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 302, at 439-447 (1981); id. § 304,
at 448. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
Life insurance beneficiaries may sue on a policy, 4 A. Corbin, supra note 24, § 807, at
211, and in fire policies made payable to the mortgagee, the mortgagee may enforce the
contract even though the policy was taken out by the mortgagor. Id. § 807, at 211.
33. Spates v. Spates, 267 Md. 72, 77, 296 A.2d 581, 584 (1972); Black & White Cabs
v. Smith, 370 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Northern Nat'l Bank v. Northern
Minnesota Nat'l Bank, 244 Minn. 202, 208-09, 70 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1955); see 2 S. Wil-
liston, supra note 29, § 347, at 792-95.
34. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. The Restatement Second has rejected
the terms creditor and donee beneficiary in favor of incidental and intended beneficiary.
Restatement (Second) Contracts Ch. 14 introductory note, at 439 (1981).
35. Coley v. English, 235 Ark. 215, 217, 357 S.W.2d 529, 530 (1962); Northern Nat'l
Bank v. Northern Minn. Nat'l Bank, 244 Minn. 202, 209, 70 N.W.2d 118, 123 (1955);
Cumis Ins. Soc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 480 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); 2 S.
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the promise is to confer on the third party a right neither due nor as-
serted to be due from the promisee, the party is a donee beneficiary.36
Here, because the agreement to procure obligates the named insured to
confer the benefit of insurance on the additional named insured, the addi-
tional named insured is a creditor third party beneficiary. In contrast, an
additional insured is a donee beneficiary3' because the named insured
owes no performance to undefined parties that fall within the definition
of insured under the policy.38
The status of the additional named insured is unique, however, be-
cause of several significant differences between its situation and that of
the standard third party beneficiary. For example, a classic issue is
whether the third party has a right to enforce the contract against the
promisor." This depends on whether the promisee intended to benefit
the third party.' In an additional named insured controversy, however,
there is no question that the named insured (promisee) intends to benefit
the additional named insured (third party beneficiary) by contracting
with the insurer (promisor); the concern is solely with the construction of
the contract itself. In addition, in the usual case there is no evidence of
the promisee's intent regarding the rights of the beneficiary except for the
contract between the promisor and the promisee.4 An additional named
insured, however, expressly bargains with the named insured for the ben-
efit of coverage; the agreement to procure thus provides evidence of the
named insured's intentions and purposes outside of the contract with the
insurer. Finally, unlike situations involving a standard third party bene-
ficiary, the special rules applicable to insurance contracts must be
Williston, supra note 29, § 356, at 826-27; see J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 29,
§ 17-2, at 606-07.
36. O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 1199, 11 N.W.2d 412, 421 (1943); Black &
White Cabs v. Smith, 370 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Finch v. Rhode Island
Grocers Ass'n, 93 R-I. 323, 329-30, 175 A.2d 177, 181 (1961); Vikingstad v. Baggott, 46
Wash. 2d 494, 497, 282 P.2d 824, 825-26 (1955); 2 S. Williston, supra note 29, § 356, at
826.
37. See 4 A. Corbin, supra note 24, § 807, at 219.
38. Although a named insured may be obligated by statute to carry insurance protec-
tion in favor of unidentified persons, such as permissive users of automobiles, see, e.g.,
Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.1(b)(4) (West Supp. 1984); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6A-4 (West Supp.
1984-85); N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84), these parties are not credi-
tor beneficiaries because they do not have a claim against the named insured. See 4 A.
Corbin, supra note 24, § 787, at 96; id, § 807, at 219.
39. Donee and creditor beneficiaries may enforce the contract whereas incidental ben-
eficiaries may not. International Erectors, Inc. v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors & Rental Serv.,
400 F.2d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1968); Johnson Farm Equip. Co. v. Cook, 230 F.2d 119, 124
(8th Cir. 1956); Hamill v. Maryland Casualty Co., 209 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1954);
Coley v. English, 235 Ark. 215, 217, 357 S.W.2d 529, 530-31 (1962); 2 S. Williston, supra
note 29, § 356, at 823-27; cf. Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652,
655, 357 N.E.2d 983, 986, 389 N.Y.S.2d 327, 330 (1976) (intent to benefit test applied).
40. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 29, § 17-2, at 607-08; 4 A. Corbin, supra note
24, § 776, at 14.
41. 4 A. Corbin, supra note 24, § 775, at 9.
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considered.42
The foregoing illustrates that an additional named insured is a unique
type of third party beneficiary. An understanding of this unique contrac-
tual structure will enable the courts to apply a procedure that avoids the
unfortunate results of the traditional analysis.
B. Judicial Treatment of Additional Named Insureds
1. The Traditional Approach
Because the courts have failed to appreciate the status of an additional
named insured as a unique type of third party beneficiary, they tradition-
ally have treated additional named insureds as either named insureds4" or
additional insureds.' This treatment has led to results contrary to the
intents45 of the parties.46
Initially, to treat the additional named insured as a named insured
may lead to results unintended by the insurer. Under this approach, in-
surers either are forced to extend broader coverage to the additional
named insured than they intended or are precluded from suing the addi-
tional named insured under a subrogation theory.47 Such treatment is
42. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
43. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 1981); see,
e.g., Unigard Ins. Co. v. Studer, 536 F.2d 1337, 1339 (10th Cir. 1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel, 441 F. Supp. 1, 7 (E.D. La. 1975), affdper curiam, 565
F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978); Rig Tenders, Inc. v. Santa Fe Drilling Co., 585 P.2d 505, 509
(Alaska 1978); Anaconda Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 616
P.2d 363, 368 (Mont. 1980) (Sheehy, J., dissenting); Pelych v. Potomac Ins. Co., 91 Misc.
2d 973, 977, 401 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
44. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 1981); see,
e.g., Landry v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 731 F.2d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1984); Tidewater
Equip. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 1981); Leventhal v. Ameri-
can Bankers Ins. Co., 159 Ga. App. 104, 108, 283 S.E.2d 3, 6-7 (1981); Swift & Co. v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Mo. 1974); Waller v. Rocky Mtn. Fire & Casualty
Co., 272 Or. 69, 76-77, 535 P.2d 530, 534 (1975) (en banc); Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash.
2d 533, 543, 197 P.2d 999, 1005 (1948).
45. The use of "intents" as opposed to "intent" reflects the fact that there are three
parties to be considered, each of which may have a different intent.
46. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Frank Briscoe Co. v. Georgia Sprinkler Co., 713 F.2d 1500, 1504 (11th
Cir. 1983) (insurer may not subrogate against an additional named insured even assuming
that the insureds intended that the additional named insured's own insurer would be
liable for indemnification); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel, 441 F.
Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. La. 1975) (endorsement issued by insurer not considered), afl'd per
curiam, 565 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978); id. at 7 (rejecting insurer's argument that addi-
tional insured was not covered for liability arising solely out of its own negligence); Smith
v. Ryan, 142 So. 2d 139, 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (insurer may not subrogate
against that party which contracted to be added to the named insured's policy notwith-
standing named insured's failure to request that insurer make the addition); E.C. Long,
Inc. v. Brennan's, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 796, 803, 252 S.E.2d 642, 647 (1979) (no subroga-
tion against an additional named insured, even if he causes the damage); Harvey's Wagon
Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 96 Nev. 215, 217-19, 606 P.2d 1095, 1096-97 (1980) (same);
New York Bd. of Fire Underwriters v. Trans Urban Constr. Co., 91 A.D.2d 115, 121-23,
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also illogical because an additional named insured is not a party to the
insurance contract and should not have the same rights and obligations
as a named insured, who is a party to the contract. Moreover, the inten-
tions of the named insured and additional named insured are often con-
travened when an additional named insured is treated as an additional
insured. The courts' failure to examine the intents of the insureds leads
them to grant to the additional named insured fewer rights than were
intended by those parties.48 Finally, because an additional insured is
never designated in the policy and is a creditor beneficiary, whereas an
additional insured is a donee beneficiary,49 an additional named insured's
rights and duties should differ from those of an additional insured.5'
The logical inconsistencies of traditional judicial treatment of an addi-
tional named insured as a named insured or an additional insured are
thus apparent. By applying an analysis that recognizes the uniqueness of
458 N.Y.S.2d 216, 219-21 (no subrogation against an additional named insured even if he
causes the damage; rejection of insurer's argument that additional named insured was not
covered for liability arising out of its own negligence), aff'd mem., 60 N.Y.2d 912, 458
N.E.2d 1255, 470 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1983); cf Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800,
803 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (recognizing that insurer intends to cover additional named insureds
only for vicarious liability); Anaconda Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance
Corp., 616 P.2d 363, 366 (Mont. 1980) (court should not burden an insurer with coverage
for all liabilities of an additional named insured).
Treating an additional named insured as a named insured may even lead to a result
contrary to the intent of the insureds. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 295-
96 (9th Cir. 1977) (unreasonable to assume that a named insured would agree to procure
liability insurance for all of the named insured's operations).
48. See, eg., Gryar v. Odeco Inc., 719 F.2d 112, 115-16 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(policy covered additional named insured's liability for negligent acts committed as
barge-owner and not for acts committed qua charterer); Tidewater Equip. Co. v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 1981) (additional named insured's rights are limited
by the terms and conditions of the policy between the named insured and the insurer);
Price v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 616 F.2d 422, 428 (9th Cir. 1980) (insurer's obliga-
tion governed by policy and not by contract between additional named insured and
named insured); Wedlock v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Corp., 554 F.2d 240, 242 (5th Cir.
1977) (policy covered additional named insured's liability for negligent acts committed as
barge-owner and not for acts as charterer); Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
152 Cal. App. 2d 292, 299, 313 P.2d 602, 607 (1957) (act of insurer in adding an addi-
tional named insured to policy need not confer any benefit); Daly v. W.E. O'Neil Constr.
Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 655, 661, 273 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1971) (insurer's obligations deter-
mined by policy provisions alone, irrespective of insureds' intent unless informed of that
intent); Swift & Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 826, 830-31 (Mo. 1974) (additional
named insured is not a named insured with respect to omnibus clause); Waller v. Rocky
Mtn. Fire & Casualty Co., 272 Or. 69, 89, 535 P.2d 530, 540 (1975) (en banc) (Tongue, J.,
disenting) (no uninsured motorist coverage provided for additional named insured despite
reasonable expectation of named insured); Holthe v. Iskowitz, 31 Wash. 2d 533, 543, 197
P.2d 999, 1005 (1948) (additional named insured is not a named insured with respect to
omnibus clause).
49. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
50. For example, a party not designated in the policy has a longer period of time to
notify the insurer of a claim. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text. Addition-
ally, an insurer is not under an obligation to give advance notice of cancellation to a party
not designated in the policy. See infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
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an additional named insured, the courts would be more likely to reach
results consistent with the intents of the parties.
2. Proposed Analysis
It is fundamental that a third party beneficiary's rights stem from the
contract itself.5  Therefore, the insurance contract, which includes the
endorsement adding the additional named insured to the policy,5 2is the
first evidence that must be examined.
If the insurance contract is clear and unambiguous regarding the addi-
tional named insured, the court must give effect to the contract lan-
guage.5" If, however, the policy or endorsement is ambiguous regarding
the additional named insured, the court should look to extrinsic evidence
in order to determine the intent of the parties. In other words, until the
intent of the parties has been determined, the rule that ambiguities are
construed against the insurer should not come into play.54 The rationale
behind construing ambiguous language against insurers is that insurance
policies are contracts of adhesion in which the insurer supplies the
terms.55 Additionally, public policy warrants providing injured parties
with an adequate source of compensation.56
This rule of construction is not applicable here. First, strict construc-
tion should not be applied to circumvent the purpose of the insurance
agreement.5 7 Further, an additional named insured is not forced to "take
the policy or leave it," but rather is asking to be added to a pre-existing
51. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 29, § 17-8, at 623; 2 S. Williston, supra note
29, § 364A, at 873; see Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th
Cir. 1973).
52. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
54. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 1292, 1296 (W.D.
Pa. 1976). See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
55. Marston v. American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035, 1038 (1st Cir. 1971);
Duggan v. Travelers Indem. Co., 383 F.2d 871, 875-76 (1st Cir. 1967); United States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979); Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 65
Cal. 2d 100, 110, 416 P.2d 801, 808, 52 Cal. Rptr. 569, 576 (1966); Hensley v. Erie Ins.
Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 229 (W. Va. 1981); 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7402, at 197; 2
G. Couch, supra note 1, § 15:78, at 382-83; 6 S. Williston, supra note 29, § 900, at 19;
Keeton, supra note 30, at 966; see Treasure Craft Jewelers, Inc. v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 583
F.2d 650, 652 (3d Cir. 1978); Griffin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 487 F. Supp. 755, 759
(D.N.D. 1979), affld, 624 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1980); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., 491 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tenn. 1973).
56. Float-Away Door Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 372 F.2d 701, 705 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 823 (1967); Eggerding v. Bicknell, 20 N.J. 106, 113, 118
A.2d 820, 824 (1955); cf Kansas City Insulation Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
405 F.2d 53, 61 n.13 (8th Cir. 1968) (injured claimant entitled to rule of strict
construction).
57. Nielson v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223, 226, 596 P.2d 95,
98 (1979); 2 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 15:74, at 357; see Safeco Ins. Co. v. Banks, 275
Ala. 119, 122, 152 So. 2d 660, 670 (1963); Wyman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 29 A.D.2d 319,
323-24, 288 N.Y.S.2d 250, 255 (1968); First Far W. Transp., Inc. v. Carolina Casualty
Ins. Co., 47 Or. App. 339, 344, 614 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1980); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kent, 85
Wash. 2d 942, 946, 540 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1975) (en banc).
[Vol. 53
1984] ADDITIONAL NAMED INSUREDS
policy. The policy, therefore, is not a contract of adhesion as regards the
additional named insured.5" Finally, because an additional named in-
sured will often have other insurance5 9 or have recourse against the
named insured,"° the rationale of ensuring that the injured party will be
fully compensated does not apply.
In order to clarify ambiguous language, the court must seek to dis-
cover the intentions of the insureds and the insurer when the additional
named insured was added to the policy.6 The intent of the insureds is
reflected by the language of, and the circumstances surrounding, the
agreement to procure. Despite the fact that the additional named in-
sured is not a party to the insurance contract,6" his intent is relevant to
the construction of that contract because the intent of the named insured
in requesting the added coverage is directly dependent on the bargain
that the additional named insured made with the named insured.63 The
insurer's intent is reflected by the language of both the policy and the
endorsement and by the amount of premium charged for undertaking the
additional risk."4 Finally, the overall circumstances surrounding, and
purpose behind, the entire arrangement are also relevant to determining
the intents of the parties.65 For example, one court has held that the
58. See Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Servs., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. 1982) (en banc);
2 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 15:78, at 387; cf Cook v. Kozell, 176 Ohio St. 332, 336, 199
N.E.2d 566, 569 (1964) (plaintiff who is not a party to the contract cannot urge that the
policy be construed strictly against the insurer); McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v.
Villa France, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (third person not a party to
the contract not entitled to strict construction in his favor in determining whether the
contract was made for his benefit).
59. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d 751, 753-54 (7th Cir.
1981); Tidewater Equip. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 503, 505 (4th Cir. 1981);
Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1977); Offshore Logistics Serv.,
Inc., v. Mutual Marine Office, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 485, 492-93 (E.D. La. 1978); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel, 441 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd per
curiam, 565 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978).
60. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
61. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 804 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Grayson v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 922, 927 (D.S.C. 1970); Zito v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 36 Cal.
App. 3d 277, 284, 111 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397 (1973); Wyatt v. Woodmen Accident and Life
Co., 194 Neb. 614, 617, 234 N.W.2d 217, 219-20 (1975); Celley v. Mutual Benefit Health
& Accident Ass'n, 229 Pa. Super. 475, 483, 324 A.2d 430, 435 (1974); see Pilgrim Laun-
dry & Dry Cleaning Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 191, 193 (4th Cir. 1944); Waak v.
National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 180 Neb. 129, 132, 141 N.W.2d 454, 457 (1966); 2 G.
Couch, supra note 1, § 15:9, at 145.
62. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
63. See Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 296 (9th Cir. 1977); Anaconda Co.
v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 616 P.2d 363, 366 (Mont. 1980); cf.
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. Va. 1979) (court
looked to contract to procure); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 406 F.
Supp. 1292, 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (same); Midwest Lumber Co. v. Dwight E. Nelson
Constr. Co., 188 Neb. 308, 309-10, 196 N.W.2d 379, 388 (1972) (same).
64. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kent, 85 Wash. 2d 942, 946, 540 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1975) (en
banc).
65. Zelinsky v. Associated Aviation Underwriters, 478 F.2d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1973);
Danielson v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 309 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Underwrit-
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custom and practice in the insurance industry of insuring additional
named insureds only for vicarious liability is probative of the intents of
the parties.66 Another has stated that it would be absurd to believe that a
subcontractor would agree to procure liability insurance covering all of
the operations of the additional named insured general contractor.67
When the intent of the insurer is in accordance with that of the in-
sureds, the court's construction of the policy should effectuate that in-
tent,68 and the general rule of construing ambiguous language against the
insurer should not be applied so as to circumvent that intent. To apply
blindly the general rule before analyzing the relationship and intents of
the parties would subvert the principal goal of construing insurance poli-
cies: to give effect to the intent of the parties.69
Conversely, when the intent of the insurer is not in accordance with
that of the insureds, the general rule that ambiguities are to be construed
against the insurer should be applied.7° The result is that when the in-
tents diverge, the intent of the insureds will be given effect. This conclu-
sion comports with the view that the expectations of the insured should
be given great weight7 and recognizes that an insurer may avoid the rule
of strict construction through the use of clear and unambiguous lan-
guage.72 It is not unreasonable to require an insurer to express its intent
clearly and unambiguously73 and to give effect to the intent of the in-
ers at Lloyd's v. Hunefeld, 230 Cal. App. 2d 31, 39, 40 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664 (1964); 13 J.
Appleman, supra note 1, § 7383, at 46-47; see City of Spencer v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co.,
216 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Iowa 1974); McGann v. Hobbs Lumber Co., 150 W. Va. 364, 370,
145 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1965).
66. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
67. Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1977).
68. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. The mere assertion by the insureds
that they intended broad rights, however, should not be sufficient for a finding of diver-
gent intents. The court must ascertain the objective intent of the insureds by examining
the agreement to procure.
71. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Gage Plumbing & Heating Co., 433 F.2d 1051, 1054
(10th Cir. 1970); Jarvis v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 633 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1981);
Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 3d 216, 219, 514 P.2d 1219, 1221, 110 Cal. Rptr. 139,
141 (1973); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-71, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966); Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Gollan, 118 N.H. 744,
747, 394 A.2d 839, 842 (1978); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d
91, 98, 267 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1978); 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7486, at 626; Kee-
ton, supra note 30, at 961; cf. Jordan v. United Equitable Life Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 664,
666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (exceptions to liability construed to give insured reasonably
expected protection); Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616, 619,
533 P.2d 737, 740 (1975) (no ambiguities needed to invoke doctrine of reasonable
expectations).
72. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
73. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nessossis, 189 Miss. 414, 426, 196 So. 766, 769 (1940);
see London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Ladd, 299 F. 562, 564 (6th Cir. 1924); Law v.
Hawaiian Life Ins. Co., 51 Haw. 288, 292, 459 P.2d 195, 198 (1969); Farm Bureau Ins.
Co. v. Pedlow, 3 Mich. App. 478, 485, 142 N.W.2d 877, 880 (1966); 2 G. Couch, supra
note 1, § 15:78, at 382-89.
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sureds when it fails to do so.
II. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION TO
DETERMINING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF ADDITIONAL
NAMED INSUREDS
The procedure outlined in Part I provides the courts with a consistent
method for determining both the extent of coverage afforded an addi-
tional named insured and its other rights and duties. Such an analysis
can be facilitated by an examination of the following hypothetical.74
Owner seeks to make improvements on his property and hires Contrac-
tor to do the work. As part of the arrangement, Contractor agrees in
writing to provide insurance covering Owner for liability that may arise
due to the acts of Contractor. Contractor then negotiates with Insurer,
who issues to Contractor an endorsement adding Owner as an insured to
Contractor's pre-existing liability policy. The endorsement states that
Owner shall be covered "as his interest may appear.""' Insurer charges
little or no additional premium for the added risk.76
During the course of the property improvement, Owner negligently
allows a piece of lumber to injure severely an employee of a subcontrac-
tor. The injured worker sues Owner for negligence. Owner, as an addi-
tional named insured, promptly notifies Insurer of the claim, believing
that he is covered under Contractor's liability policy. Insurer flatly re-
jects the claim that Owner was covered for liability arising out of his own
negligence.77
74. The facts in the hypothetical are similar to those in Anaconda Co. v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 616 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1980). In that case, Ana-
conda, the owner of a smelter operation, hired a contractor to make improvements on its
property. Id. at 364. Pursuant to their agreement, Anaconda was added to the contrac-
tor's pre-existing liability policy. Id. An employee of Anaconda negligently injured a sub-
contractor's employee, and the insurer refused to insure and defend. Id. Because the
endorsement stated that Anaconda was an insured in accordance with the contract be-
tween the insureds, id. at 368, the court unwittingly applied the proper analysis and at-
tempted to determine the type of risks the additional named insured and the named
insured intended to cover under the insurance provisions of their contract. Id. at 366. The
dissent, however, failed to appreciate the status of Anaconda as a unique type of third-
party beneficiary and simply treated Anaconda as a named insured. Id. at 367-68
(Sheehy, J., dissenting). The majority remanded for a determination of whether the work
being performed by the Anaconda employee at the time of the accident was undertaken
pursuant to the contract between Anaconda and the contractor. Id. at 366-67.
75. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
77. Insurers often argue that they intended to cover an additional named insured for
only vicarious liabilty and not for liability arising out of the additional named insured's
own acts. See, e.g., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1977);
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 630, 633 (E.D. Va. 1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mobile
Drilling Barge or Vessel, 441 F. Supp. 1, 7 (E.D. La. 1975), affd per curiam, 565 F.2d
958 (5th Cir. 1978); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 1292,
1295 (W.D. Pa. 1976); First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648, 653 (Hawaii 1983); New
York Bd. of Fire Underwriters v. Trans Urban Constr. Co., 91 A.D.2d 115, 119, 458
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A. The Extent of Liability Coverage Afforded an Additional Named
Insured
In resolving the dispute posed in the hypothetical, the endorsement
adding Owner as an additional named insured is the primary evidence of
the extent of coverage afforded to him.78 If the endorsement is clear and
unambiguous, the court is bound by its terms.79 Thus, with the use of
clear and unambiguous language in the endorsement, Insurer could have
limited the scope of coverage afforded to Owner." Courts have recog-
nized that the parties to an insurance contract must be bound to the
terms of the agreement, 8 and they will not strain to create ambiguities in
order to find broad coverage. 82 Insurers have the right to negotiate the
risks they are covering under the insurance agreement, 83 and the rights of
an additional named insured, as a third party beneficiary, must stem
N.Y.S.2d 216, 219, affid mem., 60 N.Y.2d 912, 458 N.E.2d 1255, 470 N.Y.S.2d 578
(1983); cf United Nuclear Corp. v. Mission Ins. Co., 97 N.M. 647, 656, 642 P.2d 1106,
1115 (Ct. App. 1982) (insurer asserted that additional named insured under builders risk
policy is covered only for damage to own property on job site and not for damage to
other's property caused by the additional named insured's negligence).
78. Endorsements are part of the policy, and when the terms of the endorsement
conflict with those in the policy proper, those in the endorsement control. See supra note
13 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
80. For example, in First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648 (Hawaii 1983), the State of
Hawaii, an additional named insured, was not afforded protection for liability arising out
of its own negligence in failing to warn the public. Id. at 656. The endorsement read:
The "Persons Insured" provision is amended to include as an insured the per-
son or organization named above [the State] (hereinafter called "additional in-
sured"), but only with respect to liability arising out of (1) operations
performed for the additional insured by the named insured at the location desig-
nated above or (2) acts or omissions of the additional insured in connection with
his general supervision of such operations.
Id. at 653.
Insurers have effectively limited the coverage afforded the additional named insured in
other cases as well. See, e.g., Landry v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 731 F.2d 299, 304 (5th
Cir. 1984); Home Indem. Co. v. Wilson, 107 Ariz. 434, 436, 489 P.2d 244, 247 (1971);
Caduceus Self Ins. Fund v. South Florida Emergency Physicians, 436 So. 2d 1034, 1035
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 406 F.
Supp. 1292, 1295 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (although endorsement's language was found ambigu-
ous, it had the effect of restricting coverage for liability arising out of only the named
insured's negligence).
81. Imperial Enters. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 535 F.2d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 1976);
Wiley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. 1974); Allen v. Manhattan Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 519 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); 13 J. Appleman, supra note
1, § 7381, at 14-16; 2 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 15:10, at 146-48; see Dunsmore v. Co-
operative Fire Ins. Ass'n, 131 Vt. 14, 16-17, 298 A.2d 853, 854 (1972).
82. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
83. First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 428 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971); Fitzgerald v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 132 Ga.
App. 610, 610, 208 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1974); Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Diebold,
511 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); 2 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 15:48, at 278; see
Weisberg v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 36 Mich. App. 513, 517-19, 194 N.W.2d 193,
195-196 (1971); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Eagles Lodge, 282 Minn. 477, 479, 165
N.W.2d 554, 556 (1969); 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7381, at 1-8.
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from the insurance agreement itself.s4 Such a construction does not leave
an additional named insured without a remedy. If the contract of insur-
ance did not cover Owner to the extent for which he bargained with Con-
tractor, Owner can sue Contractor for breaching their agreement to
procure.85 In addition, if Owner is aware of the language in the endorse-
ment, he can seek to modify its terms.8 6
When the endorsement indicates no distinction between the named in-
sured and the additional named insured, there are no ambiguities,87 and
the courts have treated the additional named insured exactly as a named
insured in determining the extent of coverage.88 The additional named
insured is also, however, subject to the exclusions and limitations con-
tained in the policy.8 9
84. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
85. See Fleet Transp. Co. v. Mullis, 727 F.2d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1984); Tidewater
Equip. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 503, 505-06 (4th Cir. 1981); Ramsey v.
Marutamaya Ogatsu Fireworks Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 516, 536, 140 Cal. Rptr. 247, 259
(1977); Klinger-Holtze v. Sulzbach Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 1978);
Ordonez v. W.T. Grant Co., 297 So. 2d 780, 782 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Midwest Lumber
Co. v. Dwight E. Nelson Constr. Co., 188 Neb. 308, 311, 196 N.W.2d 377, 379-80 (1972).
"It has been stated that one who agrees to obtain insurance, but who neglects his obliga-
tions in this respect, becomes himself an insurer of the property." 4 1. Appleman, supra
note 1, § 2261, at 179; see Smith v. Ryan, 142 So. 2d 139, 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
The additional named insured may recover even if he does not read the policy. See Colo-
nial Say. Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. 1976). The additional named insured
may sue in tort for the named insured's negligent failure to perform, or for breach of
contract. Bank of French Broad v. Bryan, 240 N.C. 610, 612, 83 S.E.2d 485, 487 (1954);
4 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 2270, at 219.
86. Landry v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 731 F.2d 299, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1984).
87. For an ambiguity to exist, there must be some language in the policy to create
doubt. Kinnavy v. Trail, 56 Mich. App. 370, 375, 223 N.W.2d 741, 743-44 (1974), af'd,
397 Mich. 521, 244 N.W.2d 924 (1976); 13 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 7386, at 36
(Supp. 1984).
88. See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 1981);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel, 441 F. Supp. 1, 7 (E.D. La. 1975),
aff'dper curiam, 565 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978); Rig Tenders, Inc. v. Santa Fe Drilling Co.,
585 P.2d 505, 509 (Alaska 1978); Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 292, 297, 313 P.2d 602, 607 (1957); District-Realty Title Ins. Corp. v. Jack
Spicer Real Estate, Inc., 280 Md. 422, 426, 373 A.2d 952, 955 (1977); Anaconda Co. v.
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 616 P.2d 363, 367-68 (Mont. 1980)
(Sheehy, J., dissenting); Pelych v. Potomac Ins. Co., 91 Misc. 2d 973, 977-78, 401
N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1977). The rationale of the rule is that if the insurer intended
to limit the coverage afforded the additional named insured he could have expressed that
intent. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Gage Plumbing and Heating Co., 433 F.2d 1051,
1054-55 (10th Cir. 1970); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel, 441 F. Supp.
1, 7 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 565 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978); Harvey's Wagon
Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween Constr. Co., 96 Nev. 215, 220, 606 P.2d 1095, 1098 (1980).
89. District-Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc., 280 Md. 422, 426,
373 A.2d 952, 955 (1977); see Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d 751, 759
(7th Cir. 1981); Tidewater Equip. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 503, 506 (4th Cir.
1981); Rig Tenders, Inc. v. Santa Fe Drilling Co., 585 P.2d 505, 509 (Alaska 1978);
Oakland Stadium v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 152 Cal App. 2d 292, 297, 313 P.2d 602,
607 (1957); see also Lezak & Levy Wholesale Meats, Inc. v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co.,
121 Ill. App. 3d 954, 955, 460 N.E.2d 475, 476 (1984) (policy expressly stated that exclu-
sions applied to any party designated as an additional named insured); cf Daly v. W.E.
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In many endorsements adding additional named insureds to pre-ex-
isting liability policies the language employed shows an intent to distin-
guish the coverage afforded the additional named insured from that
afforded the named insured, but the degree to which coverage is to differ
is not clearly expressed. In the hypothetical, for example, the endorse-
ment stated that Owner was covered for liability "as his interest may
appear."9 ° This language has repeatedly been held to be ambiguous. 9'
In construing such an endorsement, a court should attempt to determine
the intents of the parties by examining the extrinsic evidence available.92
If Owner and Contractor, as well as Insurer, all intended that a partic-
ular type of liability be covered, it seems clear that Owner should be
provided with such coverage. If, on the other hand, the insureds and
O'Neil Constr. Co., 133 Ill. App. 2d 655, 659, 273 N.E.2d 505, 508 (1971) (insurers
obligations to the additional named insured determined by an examination of the policy
provisions); 12 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 45:307, at 641 (additional insured's rights are
limited by the terms and conditions contained in the policy). The rationale behind this
rule is that it would be unlikely that the parties could have intended to provide the addi-
tional named insured with greater coverage than that provided the named insured. See
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp., 663 F.2d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 1981) (parties in-
tended additional named insured to have same coverage as named insured); Rig Tenders,
Inc. v. Santa Fe Drilling Co., 585 P.2d 505, 509 (Alaska 1978) (insurer could not have
intended to assume unlimited liability as to the additional named insured when it was
unwilling to accept such liability for the named insured); Oakland Stadium v. Underwrit-
ers at Lloyd's, 152 Cal. App. 2d 292, 297, 313 P.2d 602, 605 (1957) (to hold otherwise
would place the additional named insured in a better position than the named insured);
District-Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Jack Spicer Real Estate, Inc., 280 Md. 422, 426, 373
A.2d 952, 955 (1977) (parties intended additional named insured to be subject to the same
conditions as the named insured). Further, the rights of the additional named insured as a
third party beneficiary must stem from the contract itself. See supra note 51 and accom-
panying text.
90. See, e.g., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 294 (9th Cir. 1977) (general
contractor an additional insured "only as respects their [sic] interest as they may ap-
pear"); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (policy applies to
additional insured but only for "liability resulting from occurrences arising out of negli-
gence" of the named insured); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp.
630, 632 (E.D. Va. 1979) (city included as an additional insured "as respects the activities
of the named insured"); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp.
1292, 1294 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (additional insured covered "only with respect to acts or
omissions of the named insured"); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mobile Drilling Barge or Vessel, 441
F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. La. 1975) (additional insured covered "only with respects (sic) to"
named insured's operation), affd per curiam, 565 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1978); Truck Ins.
Exch. v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 288 Md. 428, 431, 418 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1980) (additional
named insured covered "for passenger cars he may rent to others, or operate under his
...franchise"); Anaconda Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 616
P.2d 363, 368 (Mont. 1980) (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (additional insured covered "in ac-
cordance with" the agreement to procure); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween
Constr. Co., 96 Nev. 215, 216, 606 P.2d 1095, 1096 (1980) (included as insureds "as their
interests may appear"); Sentry Ins. Co. v. George A. Rutherford, Inc., 92 N.M. 210, 210,
585 P.2d 1091, 1091 (1978) (additional named insured covered "as his interest may ap-
pear"); United Nuclear Corp. v. Mission Ins. Co., 97 N.M. 647, 651, 642 P.2d 1106, 1110
(Ct. App. 1982) (parties are co-insured "as their interest may appear").
91. United Nuclear Corp. v. Mission Ins. Co., 97 N.M. 647, 649, 642 P.2d 1106, 1113
(Ct. App. 1982). See supra note 90.
92. See supra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
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Insurer did not intend to cover the additional named insured for the lia-
bility arising in the controversy, it is equally clear that no coverage
should be found. Finally, if the intents of Insurer and the insureds di-
verge, the rule that ambiguous language is to be construed against the
insurer should be applied.93
In the hypothetical, the language of the agreement to procure between
Owner and Contractor clearly evidences an intent that Owner be pro-
vided with coverage only for liability arising out of the acts of Contrac-
tor. In addition, the fact that Insurer, following the custom of the
insurance industry, charged little or no additional premium9" for the ad-
ded risk reveals the same intent. The intents of the parties thus are in
accord, and Insurer should therefore not be held to cover Owner for lia-
bility arising out of Owner's own negligence. Had the agreement to pro-
cure and its surrounding circumstances reflected an intent on the part of
the insureds that Owner be covered for liability arising out of his own
negligence, the intents of the parties would have been in conflict. In such
a case, under the analysis of Part I, the rule of construing ambiguous
language against the insurer should be applied and coverage found.95
The effect of this analysis is to provide the coverage intended by the
insureds unless the language of the insurance contract is clearly to the
contrary. This approach also recognizes the special rules applicable to
insurance contracts by requiring the insurer to use clear and unambigu-
ous language. In any event, the additional named insured will have re-
course against the named insured if the policy does not provide the
coverage for which he bargained.96
B. Other Rights And Duties Of An Additional Named Insured
The analysis and procedure described in Part I can also be applied to
determine other rights and duties of an additional named insured.
1. Right To Be Defended
Most liability insurance policies grant the insurer exclusive control
over all litigation against its insured that may lead to liability covered
under the policy. 97 The insurer's purpose in seeking such a right is to
93. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
94. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1983). See supra note
12.
95. See supra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
97. 14 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 51:34, at 438; Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend
Under A Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 734, 734 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Duty to Defend]. Even when the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent, the insurer
obligates itself and intends to defend because the possibility still exists that the insurer
will be liable to indemnify. Duty to Defend, supra, at 748-50; see, e.g., Lebow Assocs. v.
Avemco Ins. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1288, 1290-91 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Priester v. Vigilant Ins.
Co., 268 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D. Iowa 1967); Wint v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 9 Cal. 3d
257, 261, 507 P.2d 1383, 1386, 107 Cal. Rptr. 175, 178 (1973); Lionel Freedman, Inc. v.
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ensure a vigorous defense in all cases in which a judgment rendered
against its insured will eventually be paid by the insurer.9" This control
is balanced by a requirement that the insurer defend its insured if the
potential exists for indemnity liability under the policy. 99 Because an
additional named insured is designated as an insured under the insurance
contract, his right to be defended is unquestioned, but the breadth of the
insurer's duty to defend an additional named insured is less clear.1°°
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 27 N.Y.2d 364, 368, 267 N.E.2d 93, 94, 318 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305
(1971); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wisc. 2d 91, 95, 267 N.W.2d
595, 597 (1978).
98. Duty to Defend, supra note 97, at 748.
99. First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648, 651-52 (Hawaii 1983); 7C J. Appleman,
supra note 1, § 4682, at 16; 14 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 51:35, at 438; see United States
Steel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 511 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1975); First
Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 466 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1972); Babcock &
Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 536 (8th Cir. 1970); Wint v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 9 Cal. 3d 257, 261-62, 507 P.2d 1383, 1386, 107 Cal. Rptr. 175, 178 (1973);
Thornton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 144, 384 N.E.2d 335, 339 (1978).
The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify and arises whenever there is
a potential for coverage, irrerespective of whether ultimate indemnity liability is found.
First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648, 652 (Hawaii 1983); Smith v. Great Am. Ins. Co.,
629 P.2d 543, 545-46 (Alaska 1981); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396,
408-10, 347 A.2d 842, 850-51 (1975); Lionel Freedman, Inc. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 27
N.Y.2d 364, 368, 267 N.E.2d 93, 94, 318 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (1971); Universal Carloading
& Distrib. Co. v. Merchants Mut. Casualty Co., 9 Misc. 2d 177, 178-79, 167 N.Y.S.2d
655, 657 (Spec. Term 1957); cf. Lebow Assocs., Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 439 F. Supp.
1288, 1292-93 (E.D. Mich 1977) (obligation to defend in actions of the nature and kind of
the policy takes precedence over an exclusion from coverage). When this potential exists,
the entire suit must be defended even though other claims of the complaint fall outside of
the policy's coverage. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 603 F.2d
780, 786 (9th Cir. 1979); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 537 (8th
Cir. 1970); First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648, 652 (Hawaii 1983); see United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 937 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States Steel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 511 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1975).
The general rule is that the duty to defend is based on the pleadings of the plaintiff's
complaint, and the allegations therein are the reference point for deciding the potential
for coverage. United States Steel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 511 F.2d 96,
99 (7th Cir. 1975); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 535 (8th Cir.
1970); Lebow Assocs., Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Priester v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D. Iowa 1967); Thornton v.
Paul, 74 11. 2d 132, 144, 384 N.E.2d 335, 339 (1978); Sprayregen v. American Indem.
Co., 105 Ill. App. 2d 318, 325, 245 N.E.2d 556, 560 (1969); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 233 So. 2d 805, 808 (Miss. 1970); 14 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 51:42, at
453; see 7C J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 4683, at 56. Any doubts as to the adequacy of
the pleadings are resolved in favor of the insured. Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277
N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1979); Kyllo v. Northland Chem. Co., 209 N.W.2d 629, 634
(N.D. 1973); 7C J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 4683, at 58. Failure to defend when such a
duty exists subjects the insurer to a breach of contract action. Chicken Delight v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 841, 849, 111 Cal Rptr. 79, 84 (1973); Thorn-
ton v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 144, 384 N.E.2d 335, 340 (1978); Kocse v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 152 N.J. Super. 371, 379, 377 A.2d 1234, 1238 (1977); 14 G. Couch, supra note 1,
§ 51:35, at 444.
100. The duty to defend is dependent on the extent of coverage, and the extent of
coverage afforded an additional named insured is unclear. See supra notes 98-99 and ac-
companying text. The breadth of the duty to defend, therefore, is not settled. Further,
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An insurer's duty to defend should apply as broadly to an additional
named insured as it does to a named insured. The courts have held that
all additional, but unnamed, insureds have the right to be defended for
all claims potentially within coverage.' ' It is clear that an additional
named insured-a creditor beneficiary bargaining for coverage under the
policy°--is entitled to at least as broad a right to be defended as is an
additional insured who, as a donee beneficiary, 0 3 is a stranger to the
contract. When a potential for coverage exists, an insurer has no less an
interest in providing a vigorous defense for a claim brought against an
additional named insured than it has for a claim brought against a named
insured. The insurer's corollary duty to defend, therefore, should apply
equally to additional named insureds and named insureds.
The courts have interpreted the duty to defend additional named in-
sureds in a broad manner, straining to find a potential for coverage."
Insurers wishing to reduce their duty to defend additional named in-
sureds can do so by limiting the coverage with the use of proper language
in the endorsement.' 015 Thus, in the hypothetical, when Owner is sued
for his negligence, Insurer will not have the duty to defend because
Owner was not covered under the endorsement for liability arising out of
his own negligence. Had the injured worker alleged that Owner was vi-
cariously liable for Contractor's negligence, for example, then the insurer
because the additional named insured is a third party beneficiary, it is possible that its
rights under the insurance contract may differ from those of the named insured.
101. Tenopir v. State Farm Mut. Co., 403 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1968); Strain Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. American S. Ins. Co., 128 Ga. App. 600, 604, 197 S.E.2d 498, 501 (1973);
7C J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 4682, at 21; see Priester v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 268 F.
Supp. 156, 160 (S.D. Iowa 1967) (omnibus insured); Universal Carloading & Distributing
Co. v. Merchants Mut. Casualty Co., 9 Misc. 2d 177, 179, 167 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657-58
(Spec. Term 1957) (same); National Serv. Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 61 Tenn. App. 362,
366-67, 454 S.W.2d 362, 365 (1969) (same).
102. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
104. See, eg., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 603 F.2d 780,
786 (9th Cir. 1979) (duty to defend additional named insured found even though major-
ity of liability was not covered under the policy); First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648, 653
(Hawaii 1983) (duty to defend found although no ultimate duty to indemnify under the
endorsement because complaint raised possibility of covered liability); Weeks v. County
of Oneida, 91 A.D.2d 1165, 1165, 459 N.Y.S.2d 334, 335-36(1983) (mem.) (duty to de-
fend additional named insured on cross-claims). A possibility of a conflict between the
two insureds does not relieve the insurer of its duty to defend the additional named in-
sured. See Priester v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 156, 160 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 1967); St.
Paul School Dist. v. Columbia Transit Corp., 321 N.W.2d 41, 47 (Minn. 1982).
105. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 630, 632-33 (E.D. Va.
1979). If the court determines that there is no basis for recovery within policy coverage,
the insurer has no duty to defend. Lionel Freedman, Inc. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 27
N.Y.2d 364, 368, 267 N.E.2d 93, 94, 318 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (1971). When a policy excep-
tion eliminates coverage for the claim, no duty to defend exists. McGann v. Hobbs Lum-
ber Co., 150 W. Va. 364, 370-71, 145 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1965); 14 G. Couch, supra note 1,
§ 51:42, at 452. But see Lebow Assocs., Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1288, 1293
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (obligation to defend actions of the nature and kind of the policy
controls over an exclusion from coverage).
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would have had a duty to defend Owner even if the claim were
baseless. 106
2. Right To Receive Advance Notice of Cancellation
Cancellation refers to the termination of the policy prior to the expira-
tion date by the act of one of the parties to the agreement. 107 Cancella-
tion is a significant act, often leaving the insured with no insurance
protection. 108 As a result, statutes commonly requir that advance no-
tice be sent to an insured as a condition precedent to an effective cancel-
lation. °9 The purpose of such a requirement is to enable the insured to
obtain insurance elsewhere before being subjected to unprotected risks. " 0
106. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
107. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 563 F.2d 971, 974 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977);
see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Security Fire & Indem. Co., 248 S.C. 307, 314,
149 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1966); Peterson v. Truck Ins. Exch., 65 Wisc. 2d 542, 552-53, 223
N.W.2d 579, 584 (1974). An insurer must strictly comply with the terms of the policy or
statute in order to effectuate a valid cancellation. Moynes v. National Sur. Corp., 272
F.2d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 1959) (policy); Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott, 219 Ark.
159, 163, 240 S.W.2d 666, 668 (1951) (same); National Indem. Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l
Mut. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 151, 153-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (statute); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Donahue, 67 A.D.2d 999, 999, 414 N.Y.S.2d 571, 571 (1979) (same); United
States Ins. Co. v. Brown, 285 S.W.2d 843, 846-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (policy); 2 R.
Long, supra note 2, at § 15.01 (policy and statute). But see Frazier v. Standard Guar. Ins.
Co., 382 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (actual notice sufficient when insurer
did not properly address notice). Failure to comply renders the cancellation nugatory,
and until proper notice is effectuated, the policy remains in force. Merrimack Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Scott, 219 Ark. 159, 166, 240 S.W.2d 666, 669 (1951); GEICO v. Mizell, 36
A.D.2d 452, 454, 320 N.Y.S.2d 936, 938 (1971).
108. 2 R. Long, supra note 2, § 15.13, at 15-48.
109. 17 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 67:132, at 591; E.g., Cal. Ins. Code § 651 (West
1972); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38-175h (1983); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 175, § 113A(2) (Michie/
Law. Co-op. 1977); N.J Stat. Ann. § 17:29C-8 (West Supp. 1970); N.Y. Ins. Law § 167-a-
(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); see Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hall, 263 Ark. 734, 737, 567
S.W.2d 296, 298 (1978); Holcomb v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 788, 788-89,
240 S.E.2d 128, 129 (1977); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Gosnell, 246 Md. 724, 728, 230 A.2d 467,
469 (1967); Hudson v. State Sec. Ins. Co., 5 S.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Mo. App. 1977);
Leatherby Ins. Co. v. Scott, 51 A.D.2d 519, 520, 378 N.Y.S.2d 399, 401 (1976); Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 7 N.C. App. 152, 157, 171 S.E.2d 601, 603 (1970); Farmers
Ins. Exch. v. Nagle, 190 N.W.2d 758, 764 (N.D. 1971); In re Hines, 509 P.2d 669, 670
(Okla. 1073); Fournier v. Ward, 111 R.I. 467, 473, 306 A.2d 802, 805 (1973); Virginia
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Va. 807, 808-09, 241 S.E.2d 754, 755 (1978);
Codd v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 19 Wash. 2d 671, 674-75, 144 P.2d 234, 238
(1943). See generally 2 R. Long, supra note 2, § 15.13, at 15-49 to 15-53 (chart listing
state statutes regarding notice of cancellation). Some states require a specific and valid
reason in order for an insurer to cancel a policy effectively. E.g., Cal. Ins. Code §§ 651,
660-669 (West 1972); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 113(A)(2) (West 1966); N.Y. Ins.
Law § 167-a(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). A typical cancellation provision may read:
"This policy may be cancelled by the company by mailing to the named insured . . .
written notice stating when not less than days thereafter cancellation shall be effective."
2 R. Long, supra note 2, § 15.01, at 15-3; see Kent v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Neb.
709, 720, 131 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1964).
110. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott, 219 Ark. 159, 163, 240 S.W.2d 666, 668
(1951); Frazier v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 382 So. 2d 392, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Moore v. Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 142 Ind. App. 334, 337-38, 234 N.E.2d
ADDITIONAL NAMED INSUREDS
It is not clear whether, for purposes of receiving advance cancellation
notice, an additional named insured is to be treated as a named insured.
Although there is no direct authority on this issue," I cases not involving
additional named insureds reveal that the courts are reluctant to allow
parties to be left without coverage in the absence of advance notice of
cancellation. 12 The status of an additional named insured as a third
party beneficiary indicates that its reliance on the protection afforded
under the insurance contract is not unreasonable," 3 and therefore the
promisor should not be able to extinguish the rights of the beneficiary
merely by notifying the promisee." 4 Moreover, failure to notify an addi-
tional named insured in advance of cancellation would deprive that party
of both the protection for which he bargained and the opportunity to
procure protection for himself. The additional named insured, therefore,
should be treated as a named insured for the purpose of receiving ad-
vance notice of cancellation.' '5 Thus, in the hypothetical, both Owner
and Contractor must receive advance notice in compliance with the can-
cellation provision applicable in the policy.
3. Duty To Notify The Insurer Of a Claim Or Accident
Liability insurance policies often require that notice of an accident be
given to the insurer as soon as practicable." 6 The purpose of such a
661, 663 (1968); Argonaut S.W. Ins. Co. v. Amci Mesh & Wire Co., 472 S.W.2d 843, 847
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
111. The court in Price v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 616 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1980).
stated in dictum that the insurer could have cancelled the policy by giving notice to the
named insured notwithstanding the existence of the additional named insured. Id. at 427.
The court found, however, that no effective cancellation had occured. Id. at 427-28.
112. A named insured may not delete an automobile from coverage entirely unless all
additional drivers who may be insured under the named insured's policy are notified.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Green, 260 Md. 411,417, 272 A.2d 383, 386 (1971); Matland v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 174 N.J. Super. 499, 509, 417 A.2d 46, 51 (1980). An insurer
may not cancel a policy covering a mutually owned automobile without first notifying all
of the owners. Hansen v. U.S.A.A. Casualty Ins. Co., 206 Neb. 147, 151-53, 291 N.W.2d
715, 718-20 (1980); see GEICO v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 62 A.D.2d
123, 125, 404 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (1978). An employee paying a portion of the premiums
under a group policy is entitled to notice although he is not a party to the insurance
contract. Shears v. All States Life Ins. Co., 242 Ala. 249, 254, 5 So. 2d 808, 812 (1942);
Lindgren v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 Ill. App. 2d 315, 318, 206 N.E.2d 734, 736
(1965); Ogden v. Continental Casualty Co., 208 Kan. 806, 810, 494 P.2d 1169, 1172
(1972); Hayes v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 235 Mo. App.
1261, 1268, 150 S.W.2d 1113, 1115 (1941).
113. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
114. "Whether or not the promisee or the contracting parties have power to rescind
• . . it is certain that the promisor acting alone can not extinguish the rights of the benefi-
ciary merely by notifying the promisee that he has repudiated the contract." 4 A. Corbin,
supra note 24, § 819, at 278.
115. If the policy states that the "insured" is entitled to notice, or if a statute requires
all known persons shown by the policy to have an interest in any loss to be notified, see
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:636(A)(2) (West 1978), it seems clear that an additional named
insured is entitled to such notice as is required.
116. See, e.g., Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 862,
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provision is to afford the insurer the opportunity to investigate the claim
adequately before he is obligated to pay.117 An additional named insured
866 (2d Cir. 1969); National Sur. Corp. v. Wells, 287 F.2d 102, 104 n.I (5th Cir. 1961);
Hawthorne v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Western
Freight Ass'n v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 255 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1966), affid
per curiam, 371 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1967); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Soules, 288 Ala.
163, 170, 258 So. 2d 872, 878 (1972); Royal Indem. Co. v. Pearson, 287 Ala. 1, 10, 246
So. 2d 652, 660 (1971); INA Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill. App. 3d 80, 82, 379
N.E.2d 34, 36 (1978); Greater Chicago Auction, Inc., v. Abram, 25 Ill. App. 3d 667, 669,
323 N.E.2d 818, 820 (1975); Monguso v. Pietrucha, 87 N.J. Super. 492, 494, 210 A.2d 81,
82 (1965); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Darter, 361 S.W 2d 254, 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
Proper notification is a condition precedent to any liability on the part of the insurer.
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 360 F. Supp. 139, 141 (D. Colo. 1973); Lowitt v.
Pearsall Chem. Corp., 242 Md. 245, 259, 219 A.2d 67, 76 (1966); Jenkins v. Burgos, 99
A.D.2d 217, 220, 472 N.Y.S.2d 373, 376 (1984); 8 J. Appleman, supra note 1, at § 4732,
at 10; 13A G. Couch, supra note 1, § 49:19, at 243; see Montgomery v. Professional Mut.
Ins. Co., 611 F.2d 818, 819 (10th Cir. 1980); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bob Roberts & Co.,
357 So. 2d 968, 969 (Ala. 1978). See generally 8 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 4732, at 21-
31 (excellent discussion of what constitutes timely notice).
117. Republic Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F. Supp. 649, 651
(S.D. W. Va. 1976); INA Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill. App. 3d 80, 83, 379 N.E.2d
34, 36 (1978); Employers Casualty Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 484 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex.
1972); 8 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 4731, at 2. Giving the insurer adequate time to
investigate helps prevent the assertion of fraudulent and unjust claims. Hawkeye-Secur-
ity Ins. Co. v. Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874, 877 (Wyo. 1974); 13A G. Couch, supra note l,
§ 49:2, at 227. There is a split of authority on whether, in order to deny liability, the
insurer must be prejudiced by the failure to give prompt notice. 13A G. Couch, supra
note 1, § 49:50, at 278-81; see Finstad v. Steiger Tractor, Inc., 301 N.W.2d 392, 397
(N.D. 1981). Some states require the insurer to prove that he was prejudiced. See, e.g.,
Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 164, 438 P.2d 311, 315 (1968) (en banc);
Dalzell v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 96, 103, 32 Cal. Rptr. 125, 130
(1963); Gregory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 134 Ga. App. 461, 466, 214 S.E.2d 696, 698-99
(1975); Barnes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 308 So. 2d 326, 328 (La. Ct. App.
1975); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 381 Mass. 278, 282, 409 N.E.2d 185, 188 (1980);
Katz Drug Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 647 S.W.2d 831, 836 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983); Cooper v. GEICO, 51 N.J. 86, 93-94, 237 A.2d 870, 873-74 (1968); Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 46 N.C. App. 427, 436, 265 S.E.2d 467, 472 (1980); Finstad
v. Steiger Tractor, Inc., 301 N.W.2d 392, 398 (N.D. 1981); Fox v. National Say. Ins. Co.,
424 P.2d 19, 25 (Okla. 1967); Lusch v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 272 Or. 593, 599, 538
P.2d 902, 905 (1975); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 72, 371 A.2d 193, 196
(1977); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 160, 282 A.2d 584, 593
(1971); Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 256 S.C. 376, 381, 182 S.E.2d 727, 729-
30 (1971); Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wash. 2d 372, 377, 535 P.2d 816, 819
(1975). Other courts view prejudice to the insurer as immaterial. See, e.g., Employers'
Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 862, 866 (2d Cir. 1969) (applying
Connecticut law); Southern Guar. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 334 So. 2d 879, 883 (Ala. 1976);
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Marez, 42 Colo. App. 536, 538, 601 P.2d 353, 354-55 (1979), aff'd,
638 P.2d 286 (Colo. 1981); Hartford Ins. Group v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 311 A.2d 506,
507 (D.C. 1973); Ach v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 191 Neb. 407, 408-09, 215 N.W.2d 518,
519-20 (1974); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 244-45, 216
P.2d 606, 616 (1950); Security Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 436,
440, 293 N.E.2d 76, 78, 340 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905 (1972); Tennesee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Nee, 643 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn. 1982); Harmon v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
172 Va. 61, 65, 200 S.E. 616, 618 (1939). The third and better view is that an unreasona-
bly late notice raises a presumption of prejudice to the insurer, placing the burden of
showing lack of prejudice on the insured party. See, e.g., Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 222 So.2d 206, 209 (Fla. 1969); Henschel v. Hawkeye-Security Ins., 178 N.W.2d
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should be required to comply with the notice provisions of the policy in
which he is named, unless the insurer has been notified adequately by
another party. 1 8 It has been held that the requirement of notice binds
an additional insured in the same manner as a named insured" 9 but
courts hold an additional named insured to a lesser standard of timeli-
ness. 2 Because an additional named insured should be aware of the
existence, if not the extent, of coverage in his favor, he should not be held
to a lower standard of notice compliance than a named insured.' 2,
Moreover, the rationale behind notification-giving the insurer time to
investigate fully 22 -applies equally to both types of insureds. Finally, a
third party beneficiary takes subject to the due performance of all condi-
tions in the contract that affect the promise in which he is interested."
Thus, in the hypothetical, in order to invoke coverage under the insur-
409, 415-16 (Iowa 1970). This view recognizes the rationale behind giving notice and that
it is often impossible for an insurer to show prejudice because all the facts are known to
the insured. See 8 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 4732, at 26-30.
118. It is immaterial who notifies the insurer as long as the standard is met. See West-
em Freight Ass'n v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 255 F. Supp. 858, 862 (W.D. Pa. 1966),
affd per curiam, 371 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1967); Leventhal v. American Bankers Ins. Co.,
159 Ga. App. 104, 105, 283 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1980); Monguso v. Pietrucha, 87 NJ. Super. 492,
496, 210 A.2d 81, 83-84 (1965); Helvy v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 148 W. Va. 51, 61, 132
S.E.2d 912, 918 (1963).
119. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 411 F.2d 862, 866 (2d
Cir. 1969); Leventhal v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 159 Ga. App. 104, 105, 283 S.E.2d
3, 5 (1980); Greater Chicago Auction, Inc. v. Abram, 25 11. App. 3d 667, 669, 323
N.E.2d 818, 820 (1975); 8 J. Appleman, supra note 1, § 4738, at 98; see Commercial
Contractors Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 152 Conn. 31, 37-38, 202 A.2d 498, 501 (1964);
Delco Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co., 40 A.D.2d 647, 648, 336
N.Y.S.2d 505, 507 (1972) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 31 N.Y.2d 1014, 294 N.E.2d 207, 341
N.Y.S.2d 619 (1973). But see Factory Mut. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kennedy, 256 S.C. 376,
381, 182 S.E.2d 727, 729-30 (1971) (noncompliance by third parties should not bar cover-
age unless insurer can show prejudice).
120. While a named insured must notify "as soon as practicable," an additional in-
sured sufficiently complies with the notice provision if notice is made within a reasonable
time after the discovery of coverage under the policy. Hawthorne v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 322 F. Supp. 1096, 1099 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (additional insured must use due diligence
to determine what, if any, coverage exists); see National Sur. Corp. v. Wells, 287 F.2d
102, 107 (5th Cir. 1961) (omnibus additional insured); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Darter, 361
S.W.2d 254, 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (same); cf. INA Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill.
App. 3d 80, 83, 379 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1978) (no coverage when delay in notice was caused
by City's lack of diligence in ascertaining whether coverage still existed).
121. See INA Ins. Co. v. City of Chicago, 62 Ill. App. 3d 80, 83, 379 N.E.2d 34, 36
(1978) (policy taken out in favor of City was renewed without City's knowledge, but its
failure to ascertain whether the policy was still in effect caused unreasonable delay in
notification; no coverage found).
122. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
123. 2 S. Williston, supra note 29, § 364A, at 8.75; see New Britain Lumber Co. v.
American Sur. Co., 113 Conn. 1, 6, 154 A. 147, 149 (1931) (beneficiary of bond must
comply with statutory requirements); Davis v. Dunn, 121 Mo. App. 490, 494, 97 S.W.
226, 227 (1906) (beneficiary's right is entirely subordinate to terms of contract); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Scarborough, 68 S.W.2d 1027, 1029 (Tex. App. 1934) (sendee of tele-
gram is third party beneficiary but cannot claim benefits of the contract while repudiating
one of its principal terms).
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ance contract, Owner would have to satisfy the same standard of prompt
notification as would Contractor.
4. Duty To Pay Premiums
The premium is the consideration paid an insurer for undertaking to
indemnify the insured against enumerated perils 124 and is the very es-
sence of the insurance agreement. 2 5 The general rule is that the insured
is primarily liable to the insurer for the payment of premiums. 126 Most
often the insurer will cancel the policy upon default, 127 but the termina-
tion of the risk does not affect the pre-existing liability of the insured for
premiums corresponding to antecedent periods of coverage.' 28
In the absence of an express or implied promise, an additional named
insured is not liable for the payment of premiums upon the named in-
sured's default.' 29 Further obligating the additional named insured be-
yond his agreement with the named insured would bind him to a
performance he never chose to undertake. The additional named insured
is a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract, 130 but because
he is not a party to that contract13 1 he should not be obligated to pay the
premiums. The additional named insured receives the benefit of coverage
under the named insured's policy in exchange for his performance under
the original contract with the named insured. The benefit of that per-
formance flows to the named insured, and the additional named insured
therefore should not be obligated to both the named insured and the
insurer.
This result provides little comfort to the insurer who has covered addi-
tional risk without the benefit of receiving additional consideration. If
124. 5 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 30:1, at 530; see Smith v. Sanft, 198 Pa. Super. 340,
344, 181 A.2d 685, 687 (1962); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 153 W. Va. 817, 824-
25, 172 S.E.2d 708, 712 (1970).
125. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U.S. 24, 30-31 (1876); Presentation Sisters,
Inc. v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 85 S.D. 678, 682, 189 N.W.2d 452, 454 (1971);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 153 W. Va. 817, 824, 172 S.E.2d 708, 712 (1970).
Payment or promise to pay the premium is a condition precedent to, or at least concur-
rent with, the insurer's obligation. Anderson v. American Standard Ins. Co., 293 N.W.2d
878, 882 (N.D. 1980); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 153 W. Va. 817, 825, 172
S.E.2d 708, 712 (1970); 5 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 30:3, at 534.
126. John Roach, Jr., Inc. v. Pingpank, 39 N.J. Super. 336, 339, 121 A.2d 32, 34
(1956); 6 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 31:135, at 142; see Peerless Ins. Co. v. Dimas, 539 F.
Supp. 46, 48 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Globe Indem. Co. v. Leesville Contracting Co., 124 So. 2d
329, 331 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
127. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U.S. 24, 30 (1876); 6 G. Couch, supra
note 1, § 32:65, at 286; Davis, supra note 2, at 42.
128. 6 G. Couch, supra note 1, § 31:138, at 145.
129. Century Ins. Agency, Inc. v. City Commerce Corp., 396 P.2d 80, 81 (Alaska
1964); A. Copeland Enters. v. Pickett & Meador, Inc., 422 So. 2d 752, 754 (Miss. 1982);
Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Shopwell, Inc., 116 Misc. 2d 24, 26-27, 455 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56
(Spec. Term 1982); see Stevens Ins., Inc. v. Howells, 155 Mont. 494, 502-04, 473 P.2d
523, 528 (1970); 6 G. Couch, supra note I, § 31:145, at 153.
130. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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the insurer wishes to protect its interests when the additional risk it as-
sumes is substantial, it can require the additional named insured to agree
expressly to become liable for the premiums upon the default of the
named insured.132 In the hypothetical, had Contractor defaulted on the
payment of premiums under the insurance contract, Owner would not
have been liable for their payment unless Owner had expressly agreed to
undertake that burden.
CONCLUSION
An additional named insured should be treated as a distinct type of
"insured." Classifying additional named insureds as either named in-
sureds or additional insureds has often led to results contrary to the in-
tents of the parties involved. Unless the endorsement adding the
additional named insured can be construed in only one manner, a court
should treat an additional named insured as a unique type of third party
beneficiary whose intent is sometimes relevant in the construction of the
insurance contract to which he is not a party. When determining the
extent of coverage afforded an additional named insured, the endorse-
ment adding him to the policy must be examined first. If no intent to
distinguish between the named insured and the additional named insured
is apparent, then both parties must be covered to the same extent. If the
language of the endorsement clearly limits the scope of coverage, that
language must be given effect. If, however, the endorsement is ambigu-
ous, the intent of the parties would control. Only when the insurer's
intent differs from that of the insureds must the policy be construed
against the insurer.
Additional named insureds have a broad right to be defended by the
insurer and must be notified in advance of policy cancellation. They
have the same duty as the named insured to notify the insurer of a claim,
but generally are not liable for the payment of premiums.
Application of the analysis proposed in this Note will enable the courts
to avoid the unfortunate results occasioned by the placing of additional
named insureds into preconceived and often ill-fitting categories. By rec-
ognizing the unique contractual structure presented by cases involving
additional named insureds, the courts will reach results more consistent
with the intents of the parties and the overall purposes of the
arrangement.
Mark Pomerantz
132. Assuming that all of the elements of a valid contract are present, liability may be
imposed on a third party who has expressly agreed to pay premiums. 6 G. Couch, supra
note 1, § 31:146, at 154; see American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bollinger Corp., 402 F.
Supp. 1179, 1182 (V.D. Pa. 1975).
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